



Only time will tell

Risk optimization from a dynamics perspective

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Ole Peters

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Nomura, NYC



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Positioning

Innocuous
game

Leverage
optimization

How deep the
rabbit hole
goes

Name dropping:

Many thanks to Alex Adamou, Bill Klein, Reuben Hersh,
Murray Gell-Mann, Ken Arrow.



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How deep the
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① Positioning

② Innocuous game

③ Leverage optimization

④ How deep the rabbit hole goes



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My perspective

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game

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rabbit hole
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My perspective

- 17th century: mainstream economics went down a dead-end.



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- 17th century: mainstream economics went down a dead-end.
- 19th – 21st centuries: relevant mathematics developed.



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Program

Re-derive formal economics from modern starting point.



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Thesis:

Problem with randomness, *i.e.* risk.

17th-century key concept → **parallel worlds**.

21st-century mathematics → **time**.



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Innocuous game



Heads: win 50%.




Tails: lose 40%.



Innocuous game

Toss coin once a minute



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
Innocuous game

Leverage optimization

How deep the rabbit hole goes




One sequence






10 sequences






20 sequences






Average of 20 sequences






Average of 1000 sequences





Average of 1,000,000 sequences





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
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rabbit hole
goes

Good game?




Play for one hour...






..continue one day (note scales)...






..continue one week (note scales)...





..continue one year (note scales)...





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
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
Leverage optimization

How deep the rabbit hole goes

Ensemble perspective



Time perspective





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

How deep the rabbit hole goes

Non-ergodic

Ensemble perspective

\neq

Time perspective





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

How deep the rabbit hole goes

Non-ergodic

Ensemble perspective

\neq

Time perspective



Non-commuting limits

$$\lim_{T \rightarrow \infty} \lim_{N \rightarrow \infty} g_{\text{est}}$$

\neq

$$\lim_{N \rightarrow \infty} \lim_{T \rightarrow \infty} g_{\text{est}}$$



No magic.

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
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Ensemble perspective



Result: \$110.25



No magic.

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
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
How deep the rabbit hole goes

Ensemble perspective



Result: \$110.25

Time perspective



Result: \$90



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rabbit hole
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Message:

Expectation value meaningful only if

- observable is ergodic
- a physical ensemble exists

Otherwise meaningless.



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Leverage optimization

How deep the rabbit hole goes

Problem: find proportion of wealth to invest in some venture.

	Neoclassical economics	Time perspective
Model	Random variable Δx to represent changes in wealth.	Stochastic process $x(t)$ to represent wealth over time.
Technique	1656 –1738: compute expectation value $\langle \Delta x \rangle$. 1738 onwards: find utility function $u(x)$, optimize expectation value $\langle \Delta u(x) \rangle$.	Find ergodic observable $f(x)$. Optimize time-average performance by computing expectation value of ergodic observable.



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Leverage optimization

How deep the rabbit hole goes

Example:

geometric Brownian motion (GBM) with leverage l .

- Proportion l invested in GBM
- Proportion $1 - l$ invested in risk-free asset
- constant rebalancing, self-financed portfolio.

Wealth follows: $dx = x((\mu_r + l\mu_e)dt + l\sigma dW)$

$$\text{Solution: } x(t) = x_0 \exp\left(\left(\mu_r + l\mu_e - \frac{l^2\sigma^2}{2}\right)t + l\sigma W(t)\right)$$

→ Find optimal leverage using

- a) Utility theory.
- b) Time perspective.



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How deep the rabbit hole goes

a) Utility theory with power-law utility, $u(x) = x^\alpha$:

- Fix horizon Δt , consider random variable $x(\Delta t)$.
- Convert $x(\Delta t)$ to utility $u(x(\Delta t)) = x(\Delta t)^\alpha$,
 $u(x(\Delta t)) = x_0^\alpha \exp\left(\alpha\left(\mu_r + l\mu_e - \frac{l^2\sigma^2}{2}\right)\Delta t + \alpha l\sigma W(\Delta t)\right)$
- Find expectation value of $u(x(\Delta t))$,
 $\langle u(x(\Delta t)) \rangle = x_0^\alpha \exp\left(\alpha\Delta t\left(\mu_r + l\mu_e - \frac{l^2\sigma^2}{2} + \frac{\alpha l^2\sigma^2}{2}\right)\right)$

Implies expected change in utility $\langle \Delta u \rangle = \langle u(x(\Delta t)) \rangle - u(x_0)$.

- Set derivative to zero,
 $\frac{d\langle \Delta u \rangle}{dl} = 0$
 $= x_0^\alpha \alpha \Delta t \left(\mu_e - l\sigma^2 + \alpha l\sigma^2\right) \exp\left(\alpha\Delta t\left(\mu_r + l\mu_e - \frac{l^2\sigma^2}{2} + \frac{\alpha l^2\sigma^2}{2}\right)\right).$
- Solve for l

$$\underline{l_{\text{opt}}^u = \frac{\mu_e}{(1-\alpha)\sigma^2}.$$



b) Time perspective

- Given $x(t)$, find ergodic observable, i.e. $f(x)$ such that

$$\overbrace{\lim_{T \rightarrow \infty} \frac{1}{T} \int_0^T f(x(t)) dt}^{\text{Time average}} = \overbrace{\frac{1}{N} \sum_i^N f(x_i(t))}^{\text{Ensemble average}} = \langle f(x(t)) \rangle.$$

Solution is a growth rate, determined by dynamics,

$$f(x) = \frac{1}{\Delta t} \log(x(t + \Delta t)/x(t)).$$

- Find time average (or expectation value)

$$\bar{f} = \mu_r + l\mu_e - \frac{l^2\sigma^2}{2}.$$

- Set derivative to zero, solve for l

$$\underline{l_{\text{opt}}^t = \frac{\mu_e}{\sigma^2}}.$$



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Innocuous
game

Leverage
optimization

How deep the
rabbit hole
goes

Comments:

- $I_{\text{opt}}^u = \frac{\mu_e}{(1-\alpha)\sigma^2}$ depends on utility function (α).

$$I_{\text{opt}}^t = \frac{\mu_e}{\sigma^2} \text{ set by dynamics.}$$


- Utility: 18th century (long before ergodicity debate).
- Modern interpretation
Utility theory aims for ergodic observable, e.g. for GBM,
rate of change in log utility.
- Different questions answered
Utility theory:
 I_{opt}^u corresponds to greatest expected happiness.

Time perspective:

I_{opt}^t implies greatest growth rate.




GBM parameters $\mu_r = 5.2\%$ p.a., $\mu_e = 2.4\%$ p.a., $\sigma = 15.9\%$ p. \sqrt{a} .





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
Positioning

Innocuous game

Leverage optimization

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Innocuous
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Leverage
optimization

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rabbit hole
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Cruel world doesn't care about my risk preferences.



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Positioning

Innocuous
game

Leverage
optimization

How deep the
rabbit hole
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
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How deep the
rabbit hole
goes

384 – 322 BC

Aristotle's cosmology.





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game


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384 – 322 BC
310 – 230 BC

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Aristarchus model: heliocentric – dismissed.





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Positioning

Innocuous
game

Leverage
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Ptolemy's model: geocentric, perfect circles.





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Leverage
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
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Innocuous game

Leverage optimization

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Innocuous game

Leverage optimization

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Innocuous game

Leverage optimization

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
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Positioning

Innocuous game

Leverage optimization

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Newton – laws on earth and in heaven identical.





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Positioning

Innocuous
game

Leverage
optimization

How deep the
rabbit hole
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Mid-17th century: Crisis! All or nothing time-bound?



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1654

Probability theory

Positioning

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game

Leverage
optimization

How deep the
rabbit hole
goes



1654

Probability theory

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
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Innocuous game

Leverage optimization

How deep the rabbit hole goes





1654

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
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Positioning

Innocuous game

Leverage optimization

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Leverage optimization

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Evolution of structure

Two entities follow GBM.

$$dx_1 = x_1(\mu dt + \sigma dW_1) \text{ and } dx_2 = x_2(\mu dt + \sigma dW_2)$$

If entities pool resources, they will follow

$$dx_{12} = x_{12} \left[\mu dt + \sigma \left(\frac{1}{2} dW_1 + \frac{1}{2} dW_2 \right) \right]$$

Cooperation conundrum

Lucky partner gives, unlucky partner receives.

Expectation value grows at μ , irrespective of cooperation.

Lucky partner: why cooperate?

But: cooperation exists (multicellularity, firms, states etc).

→ **Expectation value model fails.**



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Innocuous game

Leverage optimization

How deep the rabbit hole goes

Usual story: very complicated.

Our story: non-ergodic system \rightarrow compute expectation value of *ergodic observable* under specified dynamics (time-average growth rate).

① No cooperation: $\frac{d\langle \ln(x_1) \rangle}{dt} = \frac{d\langle \ln(x_2) \rangle}{dt} = \mu - \sigma^2/2$

② Cooperation: $\frac{d\langle \ln(x_{12}) \rangle}{dt} = \mu - \sigma^2/4$



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② Cooperation: $\frac{d\langle \ln(x_{12}) \rangle}{dt} = \mu - \sigma^2/4$

Cooperators do better *over time*
(though not in expectation).

VON NEUMANN (1944):

"We need inventions on the scale of a new calculus to make progress on dynamics."

Correct, and we have that since 1944 (ITÔ).



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
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Leverage optimization

How deep the rabbit hole goes



- Good risk management = faster growth.
- Evolutionary advantage of structure (multicellularity, tribes, firms, nations) over no structure.



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Positioning

Innocuous
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Leverage
optimization

How deep the
rabbit hole
goes

Problems we can address (solve)

- optimize leverage (for any dynamic)
- map utility theory \rightarrow dynamics
- 300-year old St. Petersburg paradox
- dynamics of wealth distribution
- better economic measures than GDP
- price insurance contracts (derivatives)
- explain emergence of structure
- ...



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Leverage
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rabbit hole
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Conclusion

Correcting one deep conceptual flaw in economics
enables powerful quantitative theory.



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Innocuous
game

Leverage
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rabbit hole
goes

Thank you.

